Court Delay and the Waiting Child by Heldman, Jessica K.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 40 Issue 3 Article 7 
8-1-2003 
Court Delay and the Waiting Child 
Jessica K. Heldman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jessica K. Heldman, Court Delay and the Waiting Child, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001 (2003). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol40/iss3/7 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
HELDMAN.DOC 1/9/2020 4:31 PM 
 
 1001 
Court Delay and the Waiting Child* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1002 
II.  THE PROBLEM ................................................................................................. 1004 
 A. Evidence of Delay .................................................................................. 1006 
 B. The Impact of Delay on Children ........................................................... 1010 
III.   LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND ............................................................................ 1012 
 A. State Laws .............................................................................................. 1013 
 1. Uniform Acts ................................................................................... 1013 
 2. Sample State Statutes and Rules: California ................................... 1016 
 B. Federal Law: The Adoption and Safe Families Act ............................... 1016 
IV.   THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO DELAY ......................................................... 1018 
 A. The Lack of Specific Guidelines Based on a Child’s  
  Sense of Time ......................................................................................... 1019 
 B. The Lack of Judicial Leadership ............................................................ 1021 
 C. The Lack of Accountability Mechanisms ................................................ 1023 
V.   WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? ............................................................................... 1025 
 A. A Model for Efficiency ........................................................................... 1026 
 1. Efficiency in Action ......................................................................... 1026 
 2. Recommendations ........................................................................... 1028 
 3. Feasibility ....................................................................................... 1029 
 B. A Model for Accountability .................................................................... 1030 
 1. Accountability in Action .................................................................. 1030 
 2. Recommendations ........................................................................... 1032 
 a. Accountability Through Court Rules ....................................... 1032 
 b. Internal Accountability ............................................................ 1034 
 c. Accountability to the General Public ....................................... 1035 
VI.    CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 1037 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2004, University of San Diego School of Law.  The author wishes 
to thank Professor Robert Fellmeth for suggesting this topic and for his invaluable guidance 
and encouragement throughout law school.  The author also thanks her family: her husband 
for his constant love, patience, and support; and her parents for providing the stable and 
loving home that inspires her advocacy for children who have not been so fortunate.  
Finally, the author expresses gratitude to the children she has had the privilege to work with 
over many years, who have been her models of courage and determination.   
HELDMAN.DOC 1/9/2020  4:31 PM 
 
1002 
“[I]f we are willing to open our eyes to the suffering of the 
child, we will soon realize that it lies within us as adults 
either to turn the newborn into monsters by the way we treat 
them or to let them grow up into feeling . . . human beings.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Richard” was born on March 16, 1991.2  Four days later, his mother 
consented to his adoption, and Richard was immediately placed with 
adoptive parents.3  The new family began their life together—sharing 
birthdays, first words, and first steps.  But their lives would eventually 
be consumed by court dates, lawyers, and the heartbreak of saying 
goodbye.  The little boy, who looked to his two adoptive parents for 
comfort, nurturing, and the knowledge that he was the most cherished 
person in their world, would be taken away from them and handed over 
to total strangers.  This would not happen to Richard as an unaware 
infant, but as a young child whose tears signaled an understanding that 
something was terribly wrong. 
Daniella Janikova gave birth to Richard unbeknownst to Richard’s 
biological father, Otakar.  Daniella falsified the consent to adoption by 
asserting that she did not know the father’s identity.4  When Otakar 
made inquiries about the child, he was told the child had died.5  Daniella 
later confessed her deceit, and Otakar consulted a lawyer.6  In June of 
1991, Otakar attempted to contest the adoption of his son, but he was 
denied standing by the court.7  Otakar married Daniella in September, 
filed a petition to declare paternity in December, and was subsequently 
declared Richard’s biological father.8  Six months later, as Richard was 
growing increasingly attached to his adoptive parents, the adoption trial 
commenced.9 
 
 1. ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD: THE SEARCH FOR THE TRUE 
SELF xv (Ruth Ward trans., 1990). 
 2. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 650 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev’d, 638 N.E.2d 181 
(Ill. 1994). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 649–50.  While Daniella was pregnant, she lived with and was supported 
by Otakar.  While Otakar was attending to family business in Czechoslovakia, his aunt 
called Daniella and told her that Otakar had married another woman while in 
Czechoslovakia.  Devastated by the news, Daniella moved out of their apartment and into a 
shelter.  She soon decided that she would give the baby up for adoption.  Id. at 649. 
 5. Id. at 650. 
 6. Id. at 651. 
 7. Id.; see also In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill. 1994). 
 8. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 651. 
 9. Id. 
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The trial court terminated Otakar’s parental rights, determining that 
Otakar was unfit due to his lack of a reasonable interest in Richard 
during the child’s first thirty days of life.10  Otakar appealed from this 
judgment.11  The appellate court affirmed the termination of parental 
rights, taking more than a year to render the decision.12  After almost 
another full year had passed, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the 
lower courts,13 and Otakar, who had never even been introduced to 
Richard, was given the legal authority to take Richard from his adoptive 
family.14  This tearful transfer would finally occur when Richard was the 
tender age of four.15   
Justice Heiple, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Illinois, noted that “[t]he adoption laws of Illinois are neither complex 
nor difficult of application.”16  Given this admission, why did it take 
more than three years to decide such a simple application of law while 
a child continued to be raised by two “parents” he would never see 
again?  When addressing the issue of the long delay in resolving the 
case, Justice Heiple laid blame on the biological mother, the adoptive 
parents, and even the attorney for the adoptive parents.17  However, the 
court avoided any acknowledgement of its own failure to provide 
Richard with a timely resolution.18 
 
 10. Id.  Once Otakar was determined unfit, his consent was rendered unnecessary 
to the adoption proceedings.  Id.  Note that Otakar was not made aware that his child was 
alive until Richard was already fifty-seven days old.  In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d. at 181–82. 
 11. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d at  651. 
 12. See id. 
 13. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 183. 
 14. Gregory A. Kelson, In the Best Interest of the Child: What Have We Learned 
from Baby Jessica and Baby Richard?, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 353, 369 (2000) 
 15. Id. at 354. 
 16. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 182. 
 17. Id.  Justice Heiple’s opinion denying the rehearing in this case offers further 
insight into his views.  He again blames the adoptive parents for the long and ultimately 
fruitless appeal.  Id.  He then launches into a scathing commentary on the “journalistic 
terrorism” practiced by Bob Greene, a Chicago Tribune columnist who criticized Justice 
Heiple’s actions in the case.  Id. at 189.  He ends his rant with a less than compassionate 
remark about the effect of this decision on Richard.  He states, “It will not be an 
insurmountable trauma . . . .  It will work itself out in the fullness of time.”  Id. at 190. 
 18. Some courts have recognized the failure of the court system to resolve matters 
quickly in child placement cases.  In the Baby Richard case, the Illinois Appellate Court 
acknowledged, “It has taken two years and five months for this case to sluggishly move 
through our judicial system.  In a case of this nature, where plainly time is critical, it is a 
sad commentary on our judiciary.”  In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 656 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), 
rev’d, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994); see also In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 
961, 979 (Fla. 1995).  Justice Kogan, concurring in part and dissenting in part to the 
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This Comment directly addresses this failure, which affects countless 
children such as Richard.  It first exposes the problem by providing 
evidence of delay in both private adoption and foster care placement 
cases.  The devastating effects of this delay are also revealed.  Next, this 
Comment explores the current legal framework within which courts 
make these life-altering child placement decisions.19  Then this Comment 
confronts the question of why delay occurs, citing a number of 
contributing factors.  Finally, recommendations are offered for reducing 
delay and ensuring that a greater number of children can be placed in 
safe, stable homes. 
II.  THE PROBLEM 
 In the United States, children were once viewed as economic assets20 
or property,21 devoid of individual rights.22  Today, the words of our 
courts and our politicians indicate a new status for children, whereby 
they are not only entitled to many of the same rights as adults,23 but their 
rights and needs are considered paramount to all other concerns.24  A 
 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision to allow the adoption of Baby Emily to proceed, 
stated, “I cannot suppress a sense of abiding outrage at what our legal . . . system has 
done to [Emily]. . . .  Where does the fault lie?—It rests on inadequate laws, procedural 
rules incapable of recognizing the needs of a small growing child, . . . judges and lawyers 
who let the child’s fate bog down in a quagmire of legal technicality.”  Id. 
 19. The term “child placement” is used in this Comment to encompass “all 
legislative, judicial, and executive decisions concerned with establishing, administering, 
or rearranging parent-child relationships.”  JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 6 (1996). 
 20. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE 
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES xii (1994). 
 21. Recognizing and departing from this historical perspective on children, the 
Illinois Appellate Court stated in the Baby Richard case that “[f]ortunately, the time has 
long past when children in our society were considered the property of their parents. . . .   
To hold that a child is the property of his parents is to deny the humanity of the child.”  
In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 651–52. 
 22. For a discussion of the development of children’s rights, beginning with 
colonial society, see generally MASON, supra note 20. 
 23. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing that juveniles are entitled to 
constitutional due process in delinquency proceedings).  In this landmark case, the Court 
held that juveniles in delinquency court were entitled to many of the same rights as 
adults in criminal proceedings, such as notice of charges, opportunity for confrontation 
and cross-examination, prohibition against self-incrimination, and right to counsel.  
Marvin Ventrell, Evolution of the Dependency Component of the Juvenile Court, JUV. & 
FAM. CT. J., Fall 1998, at 17, 27–28.  This was a departure from the traditional structure 
of the juvenile court, which was developed as an alternative to the adversarial system.  In 
re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16. 
 24. For example, Justice Rizzi of the Illinois Appellate Court stated, “In an 
adoption, custody or abuse case . . . the child is the real party in interest. . . .  [I]t is his 
best interest and corollary rights that come before anything else, including the interests 
and rights of biological and adoptive parents.”  In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 652.  This 
priority has also been voiced by politicians enacting legislation to benefit children.  For 
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new commitment to children is voiced in statutes and court holdings of 
the last decade that purport to consider “the best interests of the child.”25  
Much of this new concern with children’s well-being focuses on foster 
children, those children whose homes are so abusive or neglectful that 
the state must remove the child and step into the role of parent under the 
principle of parens patriae.26 
It can be said that caring parents consider the basic needs of their 
children and attempt to satisfy those needs with little delay.  Nothing less 
should be expected of the state when acting as a parental decisionmaker 
for a child.  However, despite the state’s oft-stated commitment to 
children’s best interests, many children suffer because of the failure in 
practice to consider their needs as meritorious as the claims and needs of 
adults.27  The child’s need for swift and permanent placement in a loving 
home is thus compromised, often irretrievably.28  When a child lingers in 
“foster care drift,”29 or when a child is taken from a loving adoptive home 
 
example, in passing the Adoption and Safe Families Act, Representative Mike DeWine 
stated that the “overriding principle is that the health and safety of the child must always, 
always, always come first.”  143 CONG. REC. S12670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) 
(statement of Rep. DeWine). 
 25. Despite its frequent use, the phrase has a hollow ring when unsupported by action 
in accordance with its spirit.  One scholar has noted that the phrase is “tossed around 
loosely” and questions whether it is more than just “mere rhetoric.”  Anthony S. Zito, 
Baby Richard and Beyond: The Future for Adopted Children, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 445, 
446 (1998). 
 26. Parens patriae is defined as “the state in its capacity as provider of protection 
to those unable to care for themselves.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).  
“[T]he State in its recognized role of parens patriae is the ultimate protector of the rights 
of minors.”  Kelson, supra note 14, at 373. 
 27. Justice Heiple’s attitude illustrates this failure as he states, “These laws are 
designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive rights to their own children 
wholly apart from any consideration of the so-called best interests of the child.”  In re 
Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill. 1994). 
 28. Child advocates have concluded, “Only a minority of children achieve quick 
and certain stability . . . .”  ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CHILD RIGHTS & REMEDIES 317 (2002).  
Statistics regarding foster care outcomes exemplify this statement.  Thirty-two percent of 
children in foster care remained in care for three or more years.  The estimated number 
of months that children waiting to be adopted have been in continuous foster care breaks 
down as follows: less than one month—1%; one to five months—4%; six to eleven 
months—8%; twelve to seventeen months—10%; eighteen to twenty-three months—
11%; twenty-four to twenty-nine months—10%; thirty to thirty-five months—8%; thirty-
six to fifty-nine months—24%; and sixty or more months—24% (over 30,000 children).  
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS 
REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2001 ESTIMATES AS OF MARCH 2003 (8), at 4 (2003), available 
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report8.pdf. 
 29. The term “foster care drift” refers to the numerous placement changes that 
children are subjected to while in foster care.  FELLMETH, supra note 28, at 317.  It has 
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after years of bonding and given to biological parents, psychological 
trauma30 and discouraging predictions for the future often follow.31 
Various administrative and legislative entities report that court delay is a 
major obstacle in establishing permanency for children.  According to the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “One of the most profound 
and intractable problems in child welfare litigation is that of delay.”32  The 
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) states: “Our previous 
work, all the states we visited, and over half of our survey respondents 
identified problems with the court system as a barrier to moving children from 
foster care into safe and permanent homes.”33  Despite these observations, 
the courts proceed unchecked and unaccountable, regardless of their 
obligation to protect and foster the children in their care. 
A.  Evidence of Delay 
Although the legal processes are in some ways distinct, both private 
adoptions and dependency proceedings for children in foster care share 
many of the same barriers to timely resolution and the children involved 
confront many of the same challenges.34  In fact, adoption professionals 
have concluded that the profiles of children placed for voluntary 
adoption often reflect many of the known risk factors for child abuse and 
neglect.35  Whatever the circumstances bringing children to the attention of 
the legal system, those in need of stable families find their lives in the 
hands of the courts. 
 A significant number of children are impacted when court proceedings 
suffer delay.  The number of children in foster care alone who are affected 
by decisions of the courts is substantial.  The U.S. Department of Health 
 
been noted that many foster children have been subject to three or more different 
placements within a six year period.  Id. 
 30. See generally GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19. 
 31. See supra Part II.B. 
 32. Children’s Bureau, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services., Court 
Process, at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/adopt02 (last updated Jan. 
17, 2001). 
 33. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: RECENT LEGISLATION HELPS 
STATES FOCUS ON FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN, BUT LONG-STANDING 
BARRIERS REMAIN 36 (2002).  The GAO does the investigative work of Congress, assessing 
how public funds are used, evaluating federal programs and activities, and making 
recommendations for effective use and implementation.  This specific report was an effort 
to determine how outcomes for children in foster care have changed since the enactment 
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997.  Id. at 46. 
 34. “The decisions or actions of adults which bring a child to a court’s attention tend 
to reflect the presence of insecurity, instability, and even the danger of abuse or neglect in 
the life of the child.”  Cheryl Ryon Eisen, Using a “Brief Case Plan” Method to Reconcile 
Kinship Rights and the Best Interests of the Child When an Unwed Father Contests a 
Mother’s Decision to Place an Infant for Adoption, 23 NOVA L. REV. 339, 356 (1998). 
 35. Id. at 356–57. 
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and Human Services estimates that 581,000 children were in foster care 
on September 30, 1999,36 with 127,000 children waiting to be adopted.37  
However, statistics show that only 46,000 were adopted during the entire 
year of 1999.38   
The media has provided important evidence of the devastating 
problem of court delay.  In the 1990s, several cases regarding contested 
private adoptions became highly publicized.39  Images of children—ages 
three or four—torn crying and screaming from the arms of the only 
parents they had ever known, to be awarded to biological parents who 
had never met the children, fueled public outrage.40  In these dramatic 
cases, courts were criticized for the unreasonable length of time taken to 
render decisions in cases of such urgency.41 
During the last decade, the media has also uncovered horror stories 
about the fate of abused children in state custody, including instances of 
children dying as a result of the system’s failures.42  The public has been 
 
 36. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE 
AFCARS REPORT: INTERIM FY 1999 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2001 (6), at 1 (2001), 
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/june2001.pdf. 
 37. Id. at 3. 
 38. Id. at 4.  On average, a child in California will wait between three and five 
years for permanency.  Leonard Edwards, Too Many Kids in Foster Care: California Can 
Do Better  (2002), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/foster/EdwardsAug02.pdf.  Leonard Edwards 
is the president-elect of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.  Id. 
 39. See In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (known as the Baby Jessica case); 
In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev’d, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 1994) (known 
as the Baby Richard case); In re E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), aff’d 
and certified question answered, 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995) (known as the Baby Emily case). 
 40. Throughout the Baby Richard ordeal, Chicago Tribune columnist Bob Greene 
wrote impassioned commentary, generating more than sixty columns on the case and 
garnering an unprecedented response from readers.  Theresa Grimaldi Olsen, Bob 
Greene’s Richard File, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 11.  One 
commentator on the Baby Jessica case noted: 
The fate of the child called Jessica . . . was a matter of agitated public debate 
before, during, and after it was decided by a legal system slow to resolve the 
conflicting claims of the adoptive and birth parents and even slower to 
recognize the young child’s interest in a quick decision. 
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption and Aspiration: The Uniform Adoption Act, the 
DeBoer-Schmidt Case, and the American Quest for the Ideal Family, 2 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y  15, 15 (1995). 
 41. See In re E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 978–79 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part); Eisen, supra note 34, at 344–45; Hollinger, supra note 40, 
at 15; Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child’s Right to Protection from Transfer Trauma in a 
Contested Adoption Case, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 41, 41 (1995). 
 42. Cheryl Romo of the Los Angeles Daily Journal has written a number of stories 
highlighting the abuses of the foster care system in Southern California.  See, e.g., Cheryl 
Romo, Beatings Cause Death of Child in Foster Care, L.A. DAILY J., May 18, 2001; 
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shocked by reports of foster children lingering in a system that often 
fails to protect them, where foster care providers, entrusted by the courts, 
may themselves abuse already victimized children.43   
Although the media has brought to light the weaknesses of the child 
protective system and the courts, media exposure has been limited due to 
rules of confidentiality in the juvenile courts and the foster care 
system.44  Where there has been coverage, it has not led to systemic 
reform and these unfortunate cases persist.45 
 Further evidence of delay can be found in the details of case law, 
which reveal practices and procedures that contribute to unnecessary 
delay.  In a recent case in California, foster parents expressed a desire to 
adopt E.L.W., who was removed from his mother when she failed to 
provide him with adequate food, shelter, clothing, or medical treatment.46  
 
Cheryl Romo, L.A. Ranks First by Far in Foster-Care Abuse, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 7, 2002, 
at 2.  The Washington Post featured a four-part series profiling the case of two-month old 
Wesley Lucas, who died due to the failure of D.C. social workers to provide needed 
services.  See, e.g., Sari Horwitz et al., ‘Protected’ Children Died as Government Did 
Little, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2001, at A1; see also Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: 
Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2001); Marcia Lowry, 
Foster Care & Adoption Reform Legislation: Implementing the Adoption and Safe Families 
Act of 1997, 14 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 447, 449–50 (2000). 
 43. Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of 
Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 207–12 (1988). 
 44. Dependency proceedings have traditionally been closed to the public and the 
media in order to protect the child and the family from stigmatization.  However, this 
approach has been reconsidered in light of the inadequate treatment that children are 
receiving in the proceedings.  Some advocates argue that access to the dependency 
proceedings will result in greater accountability in the dependency court.  Bean, supra 
note 42, at 4.  See generally Mary McDevitt Gofen, Comment, The Right of Access to 
Child Custody and Dependency Cases, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 857 (1995) (asserting a First 
Amendment right of the press to attend juvenile court proceedings). 
 45. See Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1036 (2002) (“Despite pro-adoption federal policy and 
case law protecting the parental rights of birth parents, contested adoptions continue to 
arise.”).  For examples of cases that have arisen since the publicized cases of Richard, 
Jessica, and Emily, see Ex parte S.C.W., 826 So. 2d 844, 846 (Ala. 2001) (regarding a 
child born in October 1998 who continued to await the judgment of the trial court after 
the Supreme Court of Alabama remanded the case in order for the trial court to vacate  
the judgment of adoption and hold a contested hearing); Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d 700 
(Ala. 2001) (reversing the termination of parental rights and ordering the circuit court to 
determine proper custody of four-year-old “Baby Sam,” who had lived with his adoptive 
parents since he was three days old); In re A.F.S., 793 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2001) (deciding a 
case three and a half years after the contested adoption proceeding was first filed); In re 
D.L., 727 N.E.2d 990, 996 (Ill. 2000) (criticizing the fact that an evidentiary hearing was 
not commenced for nearly two years after the petition for termination of parental rights 
was filed).  In Ex parte C.V., Justice Stuart, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
stated that “[t]his case has been before the courts of this State for an unreasonably long 
period.”  810 So. 2d at 731 (Stuart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 46. In re E.L.W., No. E029923/E030241, 2002 WL 127369, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jan. 31, 2002). 
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E.L.W. was taken into protective custody on April 8, 1999.47  He was 
not freed for adoption until almost three years later.48 
 The case of E.L.W. was plagued by delay, caused in part by the 
allowance of numerous continuances.  The six-month review hearing 
was continued, and the twelve-month review hearing, referred to as a 
permanency hearing, was scheduled for fourteen months after the child 
was removed.49  That permanency hearing was then continued so that a 
later hearing could be held on a contested matter.  What followed was a 
“series of continuances,” with a final date set for December 20, 2000.50  
On this December date, the hearing was once again continued.51  The 
permanency hearing at last began twenty-two months after the child had 
been taken into custody.52  It was then continued another two days, with the 
court finally ordering a termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing to be 
held four months later.53  The TPR hearing was also eventually continued.54 
On July 12, 2001, more than two years after the child had been removed 
from his mother, parental rights were finally terminated.55  Then the child 
was placed for adoption with his current foster parents, who had cared for 
him for more than a year.56  But the foster parents could not yet call 
themselves a family; instead, they had to await a decision from the court 
of appeal.  That decision, affirming the judgment, came more than six 
months later.57 
This case was processed through a system that is federally mandated to 
consider the child’s need for safety and stability the highest priority.58  
 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at *1–4. 
 49. Id. at *2–3. 
 50. Id. at *4.  The reasons for the continuances included the social worker’s 
illness, a change of social workers, and the fact that the mother’s counsel had just been 
presented with a new psychological evaluation of his client.  Id. at *3–4.  These delays 
occurred despite statutory guidelines that state: “A continuance may be granted only upon a 
showing of good cause.  Neither a stipulation between counsel nor the convenience of 
the parties is in and of itself a good cause.”  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7871 (West 1994). 
 51. In re E.L.W., 2002 WL 127369, at *4. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at *7–11. 
 57. See id. at *12. 
 58. The Adoption and Safe Families Act, discussed infra Part II.B, provides that “the 
child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.”  42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) 
(2002); see also James R. Marsh, Federal Impact on Adoptions, in 2 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 17.02[2], at 17-5 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2001). 
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This case was processed in a state where public policy demands that judicial 
proceedings to free children from parental control reach conclusions “as 
expeditiously as possible.”59  After considering this evidence, the question 
remains: If the law and the policy are clear, why does it take years for the 
courts to resolve issues of permanency for waiting children, when the 
detrimental effects of delay are clearly recognized? 
B.  The Impact of Delay on Children 
Studies have shown that delays in resolving child placement matters 
have a significant impact on children.  Relationships that remain in 
abeyance are unable to provide security and stability for a developing 
child.60  Research has demonstrated that a child who suffers the loss of a 
parent figure, even through separation rather than death, suffers an 
increased risk of emotional and social problems in adulthood.61  This 
risk further increases if the child develops bonds with a potential family 
and then is forced to separate from these new parental figures.62  
Researchers have thus concluded that “[c]ontinuity of relationships is 
essential for a child’s healthy development.”63 
At the root of this conclusion is the theory of attachment.64  This 
theory focuses on the effect of children’s early experiences on their later 
functioning.65  Attachment is generally established within a family structure, 
 
 59. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7870(a) (West 1994). 
 60. “Even in a loving, long-term foster home, the uncertainty of the foster care 
status may cause hardship.”  Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise 
and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 655 
(1999) (footnotes omitted).  This same uncertainty can be attributed to the status of a 
child involved in a contested adoption, as the child is being cared for by would-be 
adoptive parents who may be anxious and tentative in developing bonds with the child.  
See Eisen, supra note 34, at 356 (“[A] child in [a contested adoption] is ‘at risk’ by any 
criteria used for such assessments in child welfare cases.”). 
 61. MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE 
LEGAL BATTLE, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 98 (1999). 
 62. “Where continuity of . . . relationships is interrupted more than once, as happens 
with multiple foster placements in the early years, the children’s emotional attachments 
become increasingly shallow and indiscriminate.”  GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 
19.  “Disruptions to early relationships resulting in insecure attachment experiences and 
representations make it difficult for these individuals to relate well to other people for the 
rest of their lives.”  Marcus T. Boccaccini & Eleanor Willemsen, Contested Adoption and 
the Liberty Interest of the Child, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 211, 219 (1997). 
 63. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 19. 
 64. One definition of attachment reads: “[A]n attachment is a reciprocal, enduring, 
emotional, and physical affiliation between a child and a caregiver.”  BEVERLY JAMES, 
HANDBOOK FOR TREATMENT OF ATTACHMENT-TRAUMA PROBLEMS IN CHILDREN 2 (1994). 
 65. Peter Fonagy et al., Morality, Disruptive Behavior, Borderline Personality 
Disorder, Crime, and Their Relationship to Security of Attachment, in ATTACHMENT AND 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 223, 229 (Leslie Atkinson & Kenneth J. Zucker eds., 1997).  The 
foundations of attachment theory were developed by John Bowlby beginning in the 
HELDMAN.DOC 1/9/2020  4:31 PM 
[VOL. 40:  1001, 2003]  Court Delay and the Waiting Child 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1011 
providing the child with a sense of safety and security.66  When children 
experience disruptions in their attachments, specifically prolonged 
separations, they can reach a state called “detachment,” which results in 
a failure to restart normal attachment when relationships are resumed or 
replaced.67  When children have been mistreated or placed outside of their 
homes, trust is lacking, making successful attachment formation difficult 
or impossible.68  Research suggests that this disruption in attachment 
during childhood can be correlated with later aggressive, even criminal, 
behavior in adolescence and adulthood.69 
To understand what constitutes a disruption of this sort, one must 
recognize that children experience lapses of time differently than 
adults.70  To appreciate this, one need only think back to childhood and 
remember the eternity that seemed to pass while awaiting an upcoming 
birthday.  Compare this to the oft-heard complaint of adults that each 
birthday seems to arrive all too quickly.  Children’s unique sense of time 
centers on the urgency of their basic and psychological needs, and the 
lapse of time that takes place before these needs are met can create 
harmful disruptions.71  Depending on the children’s developmental 
phase, there is a limited time during which they can endure these losses 
and uncertainties.72 
 
1950s.  This theory, controversial at the time, pointed out that long-term institutional 
care and frequent changes of maternal figures negatively affected the personality 
development of children.  Michael Rutter, Clinical Implications of Attachment Concepts: 
Retrospect and Prospect, in ATTACHMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, supra, at 17, 17; see 
1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: ATTACHMENT (1969); 2 JOHN BOWLBY, 
ATTACHMENT AND LOSS: SEPARATION (1973). 
 66. JAMES, supra note 64, at 1. 
 67. Fonagy et al., supra note 65, at 229. 
 68. JAMES, supra note 64, at 3–4. 
 69. Fonagy, supra note 65, at 230–60; see also FELLMETH, supra note 28, at 403 
(discussing the correlation between child abuse and later violence perpetrated by 
juveniles).  Studies have yielded the following results: A study of medical and 
institutional records of violent delinquents revealed that 75% had been severely 
physically abused; a study of 150 delinquents in a residential center found that 98% had 
been abused; a researcher reported that 80% of the adult sex offenders that she was 
treating had histories of childhood abuse.  Hon. Betty Friedlander, Child Maltreatment 
and Delinquency: Making the Case for Preventive Criminal Justice, in DAVID N. 
SANDBERG, THE CHILD ABUSE-DELINQUENCY CONNECTION 149, 152 (1989).  A child’s 
attachment to the parent and the parent’s attachment to the child are considered factors 
that protect against delinquency.  Sharon G. Elstein, Understanding the Relationship 
Between Maltreatment and Delinquency, 18 CHILD L. PRAC. 136, 139 (1999). 
 70. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 41. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 41–42.  “Loss of the primary attachment figure represents a loss of 
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When considering the effects of the length of court proceedings on 
children, these concepts illustrate that children can suffer serious 
psychological harm when denied prompt decisionmaking.73  In the 
landmark work The Best Interests of the Child,74 the authors recommend 
placement decisions that acknowledge children’s need for continuity of 
relationships75 and reflect children’s unique perspective on time.76  The next 
Section will examine how well these concepts are reflected in current law. 
III.  LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND 
In exploring the problem of court delay, it is important to understand 
the legal framework within which the courts must function.  It is also 
important to recognize the contexts in which families come to the courts 
for the application of these legal standards.  Children and parents, biological 
or prospective, require the assistance of the courts when issues arise in 
either direct private placements or agency placements. 
Under state laws, a direct private placement77 of a child requires that a 
biological parent or parents voluntarily relinquish parental rights to 
another adult.78  The consent of the biological parents must be obtained 
in order for a private adoption to be valid, unless there has been a waiver 
or forfeiture of parental rights.79  When the adoption is contested, which 
is most often done by a biological parent who did not officially consent 
to the adoption,80 the state court must determine custody.81 
Agency placements, on the other hand, can arise from a voluntary or 
an involuntary process.82  In a voluntary scenario, the biological parent 
surrenders all parental rights to the state or privately licensed agency, which 
then has the responsibility of placing the child.83  Currently, however, 
 
everything to a child—loss of love, safety, protection, even life itself, and prolonged 
unavailability of the primary attachment is the same as total loss for a young child.”  
JAMES, supra note 64, at 7. 
 73. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 42–43. 
 74. This edition is a compilation of the work of Joseph Goldstein, Albert J. Solnit, 
Sonja Goldstein, and Anna Freud, and was originally published in three volumes.  This 
work introduced principles that laid the groundwork for contemporary child custody 
guidelines based on the child’s special needs.  Id. at xi–xiii. 
 75. Id. at 19. 
 76. Id. at 41. 
 77. Most healthy infants are adopted through the process of private placement.  
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice, in 1 ADOPTION LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 1.05[3], at  1-68 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2002). 
 78. Id. § 1.03[3], at 1-69. 
 79. Katherine G. Thompson, Contested Adoptions: Strategy of the Case, in 2 
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.02[1], at  8-11 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2002). 
 80. Id. § 8.01[1], at 8-8.16. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Hollinger, supra note 77, § 1.05[3][a], at 1-66 to 1-67. 
 83. Id.  Furthermore, if the biological father is not a part of the transaction, the 
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most agency placements are involuntary, occurring as a result of a 
child’s removal from his or her home because of abuse or neglect and 
the subsequent termination of parental rights.84 
Traditionally, individual state governments have been the source of 
laws regarding adoption.85  This has led to a lack of uniformity in 
adoption procedures, which complicates the process.86  The following 
Sections will examine specific laws that govern child placement matters.  
Provisions specifically developed to achieve timely and permanent 
placements will be highlighted. 
A.  State Laws 
1.  Uniform Acts 
In order to bring consistency to the legal issues of adoption and child 
placement, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) has made efforts to devise uniform legal frameworks.87  
 
agency may have to attempt to locate him and notify him of the proposed adoption.  If 
the father cannot be located, the agency may have to ask the courts to terminate his 
rights.  Id. at 1-66. 
 84. Id. at 1-67.  In fact, the largest group of children available for adoption is 
children in foster care.  Marsh, supra note 58, § 17.01, at 17-2. 
 85. Marsh, supra note 58, § 17.01, at 17-2.  State courts have jurisdiction over 
consensual and contested adoptions, although federal courts often deal with the issues of 
constitutional due process and equal protection.  Hollinger, supra note 77, § 1.01[1], at 
1-5.  Consideration of these constitutional issues has become more prevalent.  Many 
scholars, practitioners, and students have crafted commentary arguing that children have 
the constitutional rights of due process and equal protection, which require as much, if 
not more, consideration as the constitutional rights of the parents in these situations.  See 
Boccaccini & Willemsen, supra note 62, at 220; Scarnecchia, supra note 41, at 48–61; 
Carrie L. Wambaugh, Comment, Biology Is Important, But Does Not Necessarily Always 
Constitute a “Family”: A Brief Survey of the Uniform Adoption Act, 32 AKRON L. REV. 
791, 827–28 (1999). 
 86. Hollinger, supra note 77, § 1.01[1], at 1-5.  The Uniform Adoption Act notes that 
“there now appear to be more inconsistencies than ever from one state to another as judges, 
agencies, lawyers, child welfare experts, and birth parents, adoptive parents, and adoptees 
squabble over . . . basic questions.”  Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Procedure, in 1 
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE app. 4-A at 4A-7 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 1994).  
Despite legislative efforts, there is inconsistent treatment among courts when dealing with 
cases of termination of parental rights and adoption.  Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, 
Expediting the Adoption Process at the Appellate Level, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 121, 123–24 (1999). 
 87. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) is a nonprofit group organized to draft and propose uniform state legislation 
on various topics.  Hollinger, supra note 86, at 4A-1.  The NCCUSL is made up of state 
legislators, judges, lawyers, and law professors who are appointed by governors of each 
state.  Id.  A number of the acts proposed by this group, including the Uniform 
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The result of these efforts has been proposed legislation such as the 
Uniform Adoption Act (UAA), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). 
In 1994, the NCCUSL approved the UAA.88  The stated purpose of the 
UAA is to “create a coherent framework for legitimizing and regulating 
both direct-placement and agency-supervised adoptions . . . [and to] 
facilitate the completion of consensual adoptions and expedite the 
resolution of contested adoptions.”89  The UAA provides for expedited 
hearings regarding contested adoptions and authorizes the courts to “make 
interim custody arrangements to protect minors against detrimental 
disruptions of stable custodial environments.”90  Despite endorsement by 
the American Bar Association, the UAA has been mired in controversy91 
and few states have adopted it as a whole or in part.92 
Efforts at uniformity have also resulted in the drafting of the 
UCCJEA.93  This Act addresses problems of interjurisdictional custody 
order enforcement, which accounted for much of the delay in the well-
publicized Baby Jessica case.94  The UCCJEA clarifies which state would 
be the proper forum for disputed custody matters when more than one 
state could assert jurisdiction95 and provides for expedited enforcement 
of custody orders.96  These clarifications can prevent harmful and time-
consuming conflicts.  This legislative effort has proven more fruitful; 
thirty-five states have enacted the UCCJEA and five more states 
introduced the legislation in 2003.97 
 
Commercial Code, have been enacted unanimously by the states.  Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 11, 14 (1994 & Supp. 2002). 
 90. Id. at 15. 
 91. Many lobbying groups have voiced opposition to the UAA.  According to the 
Reporter for the UAA, critics of the UAA are “either hostile to adoption or . . . want much 
more public agency control over adoption practices.”  Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The 
Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter’s Ruminations, 30 FAM. L.Q. 345, 377 (1996). 
 92. To date, only Vermont has adopted the UAA in its entirety.  UNIF. ADOPTION 
ACT, 9 U.L.A. at 11. 
 93. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 U.L.A 649 (1997). 
 94. See In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).  In this case, Ms. Clausen 
consented to the adoption of her daughter Jessica in the state of Iowa but then attempted to 
revoke her release of custody nine days after Jessica was placed with the DeBoers, a Michigan 
couple.  When the Iowa District Court denied the adoption of Jessica, the DeBoers asked the 
Circuit Court of Michigan to assume jurisdiction.  The interplay between the courts of Iowa 
and Michigan dragged out until Jessica was two and a half years old.  In the end, the Clausens 
were awarded custody of Jessica.  Kelson, supra note 14, at 353–61. 
 95. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT § 101 cmt. 1, 9 
U.L.A. 649, 657 (1997). 
 96. Id. at 653.  The UCCJEA specifically addresses the need for a uniform strategy 
of expeditious treatment of child custody matters as it states: “Lack of uniformity . . . can 
turn enforcement [of a child custody order] into a long and drawn out procedure.”  Id. at 652. 
 97. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the . . . Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (2001), at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_ 
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Finally, the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) addresses the issue of 
putative fathers, the central problem in the Baby Richard case.98  The 
most recent version of the UPA includes a registry law that clarifies the 
rights of men who do not fall into the categories of acknowledged, 
presumed, or adjudicated fathers.99  This clarification and the subsequent 
action of many states to institute a putative father registry100 are steps 
that legislatures have taken to prevent the difficulties that arose in the 
Baby Richard case and to address issues that continually contribute to 
delays in case resolution.101  Sixteen states enacted the original act.102  Since 
then, the UPA has been updated, and Delaware, Texas, Washington, 
and Wyoming have adopted the latest version.103  Two more states are 
introducing the UPA in 2003.104 
 
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp (last visited Aug. 26, 2003).  The previous version 
of the UCCJEA, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), was adopted in 
all fifty states.  See Kelson, supra note 14, at 357 n.40. 
 98. See discussion supra Part I. 
 99. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT PREFATORY NOTE,  9B U.L.A. (West Supp. 2003).  
According to California law, which has implemented the UPA, the child of a presumed 
father cannot be adopted without the father’s consent unless some other grounds to 
terminate parental rights exist.  The child of an alleged natural father can be adopted 
even where the father does not acquiesce as long as the court determines that the 
adoption is in the best interests of the child.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7660 (West 1994); 
see also Kristine Alton, Casenote: In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 547, 547–48 (2000).  A presumed father is one who meets statutory criteria; this 
includes a man who receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his 
natural child.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2002).  An alleged father is a man who 
alleges that he is the biological father of a child, but does not meet any of the statutory 
criteria for presumption of fatherhood.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 35000(a)(9) (2001). 
 100. This registry is intended to protect the rights of both unwed fathers and 
adoptees by requiring that notice of adoption be given to fathers who have registered 
their paternity within the prescribed period of time.  Beck, supra note 45, at 1032. 
 101. David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the 
Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 756–57 (1999).  The issue of putative fathers has 
also received attention in the U.S. Supreme Court.  See generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248 (1983) (holding that an unmarried father was not entitled to notice of adoption 
proceedings because he had failed to establish any significant relationship with his 
child); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (finding that the New York statute 
denying unwed fathers the right to consent to or to veto their children’s adoptions, while 
giving the same rights to unwed mothers, violated the fathers’ equal protection rights); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (determining that a statutory presumption that all 
unwed fathers are unfit violates their equal protection and due process rights). 
 102. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Consent to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 77, § 204[2][i], at 2-32. 
 103. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About the . . . Uniform Parentage 
Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa.asp (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 104. Id. 
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2.   Sample State Statutes and Rules: California 
Given the previously discussed legislative backdrop, states have 
developed their own guidelines for addressing child placement issues.  
On their faces, many of the provisions appear to place the child’s need 
for timely resolution at the forefront.  However, in their application, 
these laws do little to protect children’s needs.  For example, the 
California Family Code provides that on the date set for trial, the 
termination of parental rights proceedings will be given precedence over 
all other matters.105  It also states that a continuance in an adoption 
hearing may only be granted for “good cause.”106  The California Code 
of Civil Procedure states that appeals from judgments freeing minors 
from parental control or denying recommendations to free minors from 
parental control take precedence over all other appeals.107  California 
court rules require judges and clerks of the superior and reviewing courts to 
adopt procedures that expedite parental termination proceedings.108  
Although these instructions acknowledge the importance of expediting 
adoption and placement matters, they omit specific guidelines and 
compliance mechanisms.  Furthermore, these provisions fail to designate 
any repercussions for failure to implement this policy.  Therefore, many 
of these directives often go unheeded in practice. 
B.  Federal Law: The Adoption and Safe Families Act 
Since 1997, the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA)109 has set the 
standards for procedures pertaining to adoptions from foster care.  ASFA 
evolved out of an effort to reform the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980, which established a requirement to provide 
“reasonable efforts” to keep children with their families.110  In contrast, 
ASFA designated the health and safety of the child as the top priority.111 
 
 105. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7667 (West 1996). 
 106. Id. § 7871(a).  The section continues: “A continuance shall be granted only for 
that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence considered at the hearing on 
the motion.”  Id. § 7871(c). 
 107. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 45 (West Supp. 2003).  For a summary of various 
statutes relating to expediting the appeals process of child placement cases, see Stratton, 
supra note 86, 126 app. A.. 
 108. CAL. CT. R. 39.1A(f). 
 109. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 110. Marsh, supra note 58, § 17.02[1], at 17-3 to 17-5.  It was actually in 1983, 
when the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act was amended, that the requirement 
for reasonable efforts was included.  FELLMETH, supra note 28, at 311. 
 111. Marsh, supra note 58, § 17.02[2], at 17-5.  The impetuses for creation of  
ASFA were the numerous cases of children returned to parents who subsequently killed 
them, the evidence of the detrimental effect of the eighteen-month period allowed for 
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Specific provisions were devised to address the problem of children 
spending too much time in foster care, children for whom a permanent 
placement was a seemingly unattainable goal.  These provisions are as 
follows: (1) whenever a child’s permanency plan is adoption, ASFA 
requires states to make reasonable efforts to place the child in a timely 
manner;112 (2) ASFA requires states to document their specific efforts to 
put children up for adoption;113 (3) ASFA provides for concurrent 
planning, which allows states to make efforts to place children for 
adoption at the same time efforts are being made to reunify the 
families;114 (4) when interjurisdictional issues arise, the states must 
utilize cross-jurisdictional resources so these issues do not create barriers 
to permanency;115 (5) ASFA requires that a permanency hearing be held 
within twelve months of placement;116 (6) the “fast track”117 provision 
relieves states of the requirement to make reasonable efforts to reunify 
families in certain circumstances;118  (7) the “15 of 22” provision requires 
 
parents to work toward reunification, the common extension of that time frame in 
practice, and the “permanency plans” that allowed children to remain in unstable, long-
term foster care placements.  FELLMETH, supra note 28, at 314. 
 112. Marsh, supra note 58, § 17.02[2], at 17-5 to 17-6. Note that the list of 
permanency goals no longer includes long-term foster care; this is a departure from the 
Child Welfare Act of 1980.  Id. § 17.03[7], at 17-17 to 17-18. 
 113. Id. § 17.02[2], at 17-6. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  ASFA requires that a state must take steps to ensure that when an approved 
family is found outside of the relevant jurisdiction, there is no denial of or delay in the 
adoption.  In fact, states that violate this provision can be subject to penalties against 
federal foster care funds.  Child Welfare League of America, Implementing Two Key 
Provisions of ASFA, at http://www.cwla.org/programs/adoption/asfa2.htm (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2003).  ASFA also requires the GAO to investigate and report on the success or 
failure of the efforts to facilitate adoptions between jurisdictions.  Id.; see also U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOSTER CARE: HHS COULD BETTER FACILITATE THE 
INTERJURISDICTIONAL ADOPTION PROCESS 1 (1999).  The GAO reports that candidates for 
interjurisdictional placement are the children who are the hardest to place.  These children 
usually have special needs and often are older or part of a sibling group.  Id. at 10.  The 
GAO concluded that because interjurisdictional adoptions are more complex and take 
more time than adoptions within a single state, the Department of Health and Human 
Services should implement a more organized strategy and a widely available plan that 
would standardize important procedures.  Id. at 17. 
 116. Marsh, supra note 58, § 17.02[2], at 17-6.  The term “permanency hearing” 
replaced the term “disposition hearing.” A disposition hearing implied “a continued 
‘holding pattern’ status for affected children.”  FELLMETH, supra note 28, at 314. 
 117. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33, at 1. 
 118. Marsh, supra note 58, § 17.02[2], at 17-5.  These circumstances include the 
following: if there is a judicial determination that a parent has killed another of his or her 
children or committed felony assault against the child or a sibling, if parental rights to 
another child had previously been involuntarily terminated, or if the parent had subjected the 
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states to file TPR petitions as well as pursue adoptive placement for a 
child who has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-
two months.119  The last two provisions have been considered key to 
eliminating much of the delay that results from unreasonably long stays 
in foster care.120 
In order to ensure state compliance with ASFA, Congress requires 
state agencies that receive federal funds pursuant to Titles IV-B and IV-E 
of the Social Security Act to follow the provisions and regulations of 
ASFA in order to receive these funds.121  Furthermore, state court judges 
and specifically juvenile courts have the jurisdiction and the obligation 
to enforce ASFA and its regulations.122 
Although this legislative endeavor is a step in the right direction, it has 
been criticized for failing children both in practice and in principle.123  
It has been asserted that the goals of the statute go unmet if the system, 
in executing its plan, fails to apply its guidelines with common 
sense.124  In essence, the legislation can only be as effective as those 
implementing it. 
IV.  THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO DELAY 
Given the legislative outline for handling child placement cases, what 
factors create delays when these matters enter the court system?  
Although there are numerous factors that hinder prompt resolution,125  
 
child to “aggravated circumstances.”  Id.  ASFA offers examples of aggravated circumstances, 
including abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse.  Id. 
 119. Id. at 17-6.  Exceptions to this requirement include (1) when children are in 
kinship care (in the custody of a relative), (2) when there exists a documented compelling 
reason that this petition would not be in the best interest of the child, or (3) when the state 
agency has failed to provide required reunification services.  Id. at 17-6 to 17-7. 
 120. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33, at 1–2.   
 121. DEBRA RATTERMAN BAKER ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, MAKING SENSE OF THE 
ASFA REGULATIONS: A ROADMAP FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 178–81 (2001).  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress can require states to comply 
with federal regulations as a condition for receiving federal funds.  Id. at 179.  For a 
database collection of the state legislation enacted in response to ASFA, see National 
Conference of State Legislature, Child Welfare Project: Adoption and Safe Families Act 
of 1997 Resources, at www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/asfa97.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2003). 
 122. BAKER ET AL., supra note 121, at 181–85.  “All players, including judges, 
attorneys, and agencies, must abide by the obligations outlined in the regulations.”  Id. at 
181.  The authority for this can be found in the language of the Supreme Court: “[T]he 
Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby . . . .”  Id. (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 907 (1997) (alterations in original)). 
 123. See Gordon, supra note 60. 
 124. See Lowry, supra note 42, at 450. 
 125. The social service system is certainly a partner in ensuring that guidelines are 
followed in order to bring permanence to waiting children’s lives.  This part of the 
system shares responsibility for making decisions that are based in common sense and 
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this Comment focuses on the structure that the law provides the judiciary 
and the judiciary’s responsibility to work effectively within this 
framework.  In this context, delay can be attributed to a lack of (1) 
specific guidelines based on a child’s sense of time, (2) judicial 
leadership, and (3) measures of accountability for noncompliance with 
established guidelines. 
A.  The Lack of Specific Guidelines Based on                                                
a Child’s Sense of Time 
Despite legislative efforts to accelerate permanency decisions for 
children, barriers remain to eliminating delay.126  Critics have articulated 
concern that, because of ambiguous guidelines and various exceptions, parts 
of the system driven by outdated ideologies may interpret legislation 
such as ASFA so as to minimize its positive effects.127 
Lacking clear guidance, states often have been unable or unwilling 
to act in the spirit of the law.  For example, there is no federal 
provision that mandates a time frame for the litigation and finalization 
of a TPR.128  In fact, when addressing the failure of ASFA to establish 
this time frame, federal regulators commented: 
We understand the concern that court and State agency delays occur once a 
petition for TPR is filed such that it could be several years before a child is 
finally adopted.  However, our authority does not extend into the finalization of 
proceedings for termination of parental rights as this is a matter of State law.129 
This abdication of regulation to the states means that there is no check 
on whether the state law requires efficient processing.   
 Even when timetables have expressly been set by ASFA, some 
effectively undermine goals of efficiency.  For example, the time frames 
set by ASFA begin to run on the earlier of “the date of the first judicial 
finding that the child has been subjected to child abuse or neglect; or . . . 
 
stem from a commitment to comply with legislation such as AFSA, which can improve 
outcomes for many children.  See id. at 453–54.  This part of the system also confronts 
many of the same challenges that make timely action difficult.  Gordon, supra note 60, at 
679 (stating that “[e]very facet of the child welfare system is now overburdened”). 
 126. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33, at 4; Gordon, supra note 
60, at 668–70. 
 127. See Gordon, supra note 60, at 673. 
 128. Marsh, supra note 58, § 17.06[8], at 17-47. 
 129. Id.  (quoting Title IV-E Foster Care Eligibility Reviews and Child and Family 
Services State Plan Reviews, 65 Fed. Reg. 4020, 4062 (Jan. 25, 2000) (codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 1356)) (emphasis added). 
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the date that is 60 days after the date on which the child is removed from 
the home.”130  This option results in many cases remaining in abeyance 
for an extra two months,131 which pushes back the permanency hearing 
to fourteen months from time of removal, rather than the prescribed 
twelve months.132  The 15 of 22 provision effectively becomes the 17 of 
22 provision.133 
Other issues seem to have eluded legislators altogether, leaving courts 
uninstructed as to how to expedite very specific situations.  For instance, 
no law specifically addresses the situation in which the parent or parents 
of a dependent child have been convicted of certain felonies, a 
circumstance that requires two different sets of court proceedings.134  In 
most cases, the children are removed at the time the crime is committed 
and spend an extended period of time in foster care awaiting resolution 
of the parent’s criminal case.135  Judges often will not approve the fast 
track until the parent is actually convicted, which is usually at least a 
year after the actual crime has been committed.136 
It is also argued that the established time frames do not adequately 
reflect a child’s sense of time.  For infants, the standard of terminating 
parental rights after fifteen months in foster care is far too long.137  Aside 
from the psychological damage that occurs from this lapse of time, the 
practical fact is that a child’s chances for adoption decrease with age.138  
Under current time frames, infants entering foster care will often be 
toddlers by the time they are freed for adoption, and thus will have 
missed out on their prime opportunity for successful adoptions.139 
To address the lengthy appeal process, half the states have enacted 
statutes or court rules providing for expedited appeals in child placement 
cases.140  However, most provisions offer nothing more than vague 
directives, suggesting that courts “decide[] on an expedited basis”141 or 
 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(F) (2002). 
 131. Gordon, supra note 60, at 670.  A judicial finding of abuse or neglect is not a 
prerequisite to the removal of a child from the home, and therefore this finding often 
does not occur within that two-month period.  Id.  Note that in The Best Interests of the 
Child, the authors state: “For children under the age of five years, an absence of parents 
for more than two months is intolerable.”  GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 41. 
 132. Gordon, supra note 60, at 670. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33, at 25–26. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 26. 
 137. Gordon, supra note 60, at 667; see also GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 41 n.*. 
 138. Gordon, supra note 60, at 667–68.  In fact, almost half of the children adopted 
from foster care in 2001 were five years old or younger.  CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra 
note 28, at 5. 
 139. Gordon, supra note 60, at 668. 
 140. Stratton, supra note 86, at 124. 
 141. Id. at 126 app. A (quoting IND. CODE § 31-19-14-1 (1999)). 
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“render a decision as soon as possible.”142  This leaves courts without 
specific guidance as to how to implement these unclear mandates.  It is 
human nature to react to ambiguity with inaction or to fall back on one’s 
own biases in the absence of decisionmaking criteria.  Thus, many courts 
are lax in their commitment to improving court performance.  This lack of 
leadership is another factor that contributes to the problem of court delay. 
B.  The Lack of Judicial Leadership 
 Although improvements in the legal framework regarding child 
placement matters can be beneficial, one commentator aptly points out that 
“legislative change is not a panacea.”143  The courts have an obligation to 
comply with the law as it is set out, and furthermore, to be partners, or even 
leaders, in the reformation of the systems that serve children.  This judicial 
leadership is critical.144  Judicial attitudes that clash with the policy concerns 
underlying legislation, coupled with a lack of specific guidelines, result in 
an allowance of judicial discretion that can harm waiting children. 
For decades, the concept of court delay has been studied intensely and 
theorized about extensively.145  Results of this research show that the 
commitment of the courts to the reduction of court delay is one of the 
most important factors in successfully expediting court cases.146  
 
 142. Id.  (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-2-619 (1998)). 
 143. Scarnecchia, supra note 41, at 43; see also ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY, A 
CHILD IS WAITING . . . AND WAITING . . . TO BE ADOPTED IN ORANGE COUNTY 4 (2000), 
available at http://www.occourts.org/grndjury/GJAdopted.pdf (pointing out that even 
though federal legislation greatly influences child adoption policies, the systems that deal 
directly with the children are primarily governed by state law and states implement the 
law); Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 
1068 (1995) (declaring that “laws are no more effective than the judges who interpret, 
apply, and enforce them”); Zito, supra note 25, at 479 (stating that “legislatures can create 
as many laws as they want, but such laws will not make a difference if the amount of time 
taken to administer these laws through the court system takes three to four years in each case”). 
 144. COURT DELAY REDUCTION COMM., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL 
JUDGES, LITIGATION CONTROL: THE TRIAL JUDGE’S KEY TO AVOIDING DELAY 62 (1996) 
[hereinafter LITIGATION CONTROL].  “The necessity for judicial commitment to delay 
reduction is a new and essential emphasis.  It makes delay reduction both an important 
goal of the court system and of the individual judge.”  Id. at 9. 
 145. See generally id.; THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF 
LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978) (reporting the findings of eighteen months of 
research by the National Center for State Courts and the National Conference of Metropolitan 
Courts); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
TRIALS (1988) (presenting the findings from a study that collected and analyzed data from 
over one thousand jury trials in New Jersey, Colorado, and California). 
 146. “[T]he pace of criminal litigation, like the speed of processing civil cases, is 
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Implementation of policies designed to address this specific concern has 
been an effective tool.  Studies have shown that courts with firm policies 
limiting continuances experience less delay.147  Similarly, courts that 
exercise a policy of beginning trials on the originally scheduled dates 
also have succeeded in their efforts to reduce delay.148  This research 
indicates that judges, through their leadership, have the ability to 
orchestrate court proceedings so as to produce timely outcomes. 
Additional research specifically examines the problems of the courts in 
child placement cases.  The 1999 and 2002 reports from the GAO reveal 
systemic problems such as a lack of court resources, insufficient training of 
judges (resulting in judges who are unsupportive of legislative goals and 
public policy dealing with children), and a lack of cooperation between the 
courts and child welfare agencies.149  Studies conclude that there must be 
strong judicial leadership in order to reform the juvenile court system.150  
The GAO states, “[J]udges set the tone for how reform will occur; have 
the authority to institute new court rules, policies, and practices; and are 
key to bringing all child welfare system participants on board.”151 
Given this leadership role and responsibility, it is troubling that a 
number of states report that judges make decisions based solely on their 
personal beliefs, which can conflict with the stated law and policy.152  
Some judges feel parents should always be given a chance to reunify 
with their children, thus disregarding the specific fast track provision of 
 
strongly dependent on the attitudes and expectations of court system participants . . . .”  
CHURCH ET AL., supra note 145, at 61.  “If any one element is essential to the effort to 
reduce pretrial delay, it is concern by the court with delay as an institutional and social 
problem.”  Id. at 5. 
 147. LITIGATION CONTROL, supra note 144, at 12. 
 148. Id. 
 149. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33, at 36.  The study notes that 
twenty-nine states reported that their child welfare systems did not have enough judges 
or court staff; twenty-eight reported that not enough training was available for judges or 
other court personnel; and twenty-three states reported the existence of judges who were 
not supportive of ASFA goals.  Id. 
 150. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE COURTS: REFORMS AIM TO BETTER 
SERVE MALTREATED CHILDREN 21 (1999); see also IDAHO CHILD PROTECTION MANUAL 
I-8 (Elizabeth Barker Brandt ed., 2002) (“The court must demonstrate an unmistakably 
strong commitment to timely decisions in child abuse and neglect cases. . . .  The court 
must design explicit processes to ensure timely hearings and must make sure all judges 
and administrative staff implement them.”).  This manual was produced by the Idaho 
Supreme Court’s Committee to Reduce Delays for Children in Foster Care.  Id. at 1. 
 151. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 150, at 21. 
 152. In fact, some judges fail to comply with federal laws because they believe 
funding is not conditioned on their compliance.  They tend to think the regulations were 
intended for the child welfare agencies rather than the courts.  Cecilia Fiermonte, When 
the Judge Declines to Follow ASFA, CHILD L. PRAC., July 2001, at 62.  This belief is 
inaccurate, as funding does depend upon ASFA compliance.  Id.  It is suggested that 
practitioners make an effort to educate these ignorant courts through in-service training 
and simple explanations to the judges of the consequences of noncompliance.  Id. 
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ASFA.153  This results in decisions to delay scheduling TPR trials.  
North Carolina reports that scheduling these trials can take up to twelve 
months,154 and Massachusetts reports that appeals of TPR decisions can 
also take a year to schedule.155  Furthermore, some courts give parties 
great leeway to waive deadlines and are very lenient both in allowing 
continuances and in accepting excuses for delay.156  It is reported that some 
judges mistrust the judgments of caseworkers and thus order numerous 
additional assessments, which expends additional time and resources.157 
These instances of judicial decisionmaking based on personal agendas 
or opinions, in defiance of statutes and rules to the contrary, can be 
inappropriate and harmful.  It has been stated that the judicial oath of 
office requires that where rights are given by statute, judges must do 
their best to apply the law, “regardless of any personal views as to the 
wisdom of the Legislature.”158  Therefore, along with the strong need for 
specific guidelines set forth by the legislature, judicial commitment to 
follow these guidelines must be present.  Because this commitment can 
be lacking, accountability mechanisms must be established and utilized. 
C.  The Lack of Accountability Mechanisms 
State welfare agencies have been criticized for their handling of child 
welfare cases, and critics have pointed to a lack of accountability.159  
This criticism can apply to the courts as well.160  Accountability 
mechanisms for judges are few and far between.161  Judicial immunity 
limits the ways in which judges may be evaluated, thus reducing the 
means by which judges can be held accountable for harmful 
decisionmaking.162  Furthermore, the common restrictions on public 
access to dependency proceedings foster an atmosphere of secrecy and 
leave courts unscrutinized as to their handling of these cases.163 
 
 153. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33, at 24.  In addition, most of the states 
that reported on their use of the 15 of 22 provision said that the number of children exempted 
from the provision greatly exceeded the number of children to whom it was applied.  Id. at 27. 
 154. Id. at 25. 
 155. Id. at 30. 
 156. Children’s Bureau, supra note 32. 
 157. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 150, at 9. 
 158. Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d 700, 707 (Ala. 2001) (Lyons, J., concurring specially). 
 159. ORANGE COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 143, at 20. 
 160. Schafran, supra note 143, at 1067. 
 161. Id. 
 162. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 145, at 75. 
 163. Bean, supra note 42, at 54–55. 
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Judicial immunity plays an important role in the functioning of the 
court system.164  It allows judges to maintain judicial independence, 
ensuring that the resources of the judicial system will not be exhausted 
in frivolous efforts to second-guess judges’ decisions.165  Nevertheless, 
those who have studied the problem of court delay in civil and criminal 
trials point out that judges should not be completely excused from 
measures to assess their performance.166  Researchers conclude that 
providing “meaningful measures of both individual judge and aggregate 
court performance” will help to promote awareness of and concern for 
the issue of delay.167 
The practice of closed dependency hearings is also not without merit.  
It is argued that closed courtrooms protect children from invasions of 
their privacy, ensuring that the children do not have to deal with the 
humiliation of public knowledge of their trauma.168  Defenders of the 
closed court system also point to the advantages of its less formal 
atmosphere, which encourages a more social work-like approach to 
determining what is in the best interests of the child.169 
However, some advocates argue that the practice of closed dependency 
proceedings impairs efforts to reform child welfare systems.170  Courts 
can act in anonymity and secrecy with few checks and little criticism.  
Furthermore, the incongruence between allowing access to juvenile 
delinquency proceedings but not to dependency proceedings reflects a 
failure to realize that the two processes are unavoidably linked.171  
Although there is a public interest in exposing juvenile delinquents who 
may pose a threat to the public, would long-term interests not be better 
served by exposing the failures of the protective systems, which can 
contribute to the development of these delinquents in the first place? 
 
 164. Schafran, supra note 143, at 1067–68. 
 165. The concept of judicial immunity has also functioned to ensure that judges will 
make decisions based on their own convictions, without concern for what actions might 
be taken by unhappy litigants.  Hon. Patricia Walther Griffin & Rachel M. Pelegrin, A 
Look at Judicial Immunity and Its Applicability to Delaware and Pennsylvania Judges, 6 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 385, 387 (1997). 
 166. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 145, at 75 (“[A]ppropriate assessment of individual 
judicial performance is both proper and desirable.”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Bean, supra note 42, at 3. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 7–8.  Even courts that have decided to deny public access to juvenile 
courts have recognized the value of an open court.  See In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 450 
(Ohio 1990).  “As with all operations of government, the public has an interest in 
scrutinizing the working of the juvenile court.  Public access to the juvenile court process 
can promote informed public involvement in government and enhance public confidence 
in the judicial branch.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 171. Bean, supra note 42, at 7. 
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V.  WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
It is clear that the goal of quickening the pace of providing permanency 
for children must be undertaken as a partnership between the legislature 
and the judiciary.  The call has come from the judiciary itself, with judges 
urging the legislature to lead the way toward reform,172 encouraging lower 
courts to take responsibility for expediting matters,173 and sometimes 
shouldering the burden of reform themselves.174 
This Comment suggests an outline by which the goal of expediency 
may be met.  First, statutes and court rules must establish standards that  
reflect the child’s sense of time.  These standards must be specific and 
unambiguous.  Second, the courts must take responsibility for decisionmaking 
that complies with these standards.  Systems of accountability, both 
internal and external, must be put in place.  Below are two models, one 
for efficiency and one for accountability, which serve as starting points 
in creating a system through which the judiciary can become responsible 
for, and effective in, reducing delay in child placement cases. 
 
 172. See In re E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 979 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (“There is a pressing need for reforming the way these cases are 
handled . . . .  I personally urge the Family Law Rules Committee of The Florida Bar and 
the Florida Legislature to study possible methods of expediting review of disputes 
between biological and adoptive parents.”). 
 173. See Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d 700, 731 (Ala. 2001) (Stuart, J., concurring in 
the result in part and dissenting in part) (“This case has been before the courts of this 
State for an unreasonably long period; therefore, the trial court should act promptly.”); 
Brown v. Div. of Family Servs., 803 A.2d 948, 960–61 (Del. 2002) (remanding the 
matter to the family court to hold subsequent hearings and stating, “Mindful of the 
impact that such delay has on the children, we instruct the Family Court to schedule this 
matter on an accelerated, priority basis”); In re A.F.S., 793 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2001) (affirming the trial court’s jurisdiction and stating, “We are concerned . . . 
about the delay in [the case’s] resolution.  The interests of a five-year-old child are at 
stake.  As such, we strongly encourage the trial court and all parties to take whatever 
steps necessary to expedite this proceeding.”); In re D.L., 727 N.E.2d 990, 996 (Ill. 
2000) (“[W]e direct the courts below to consider, in an expedited manner, cases 
involving children like D.L., so that the minors whose futures are at stake in these 
proceedings can obtain a prompt, just, and final resolution of their status.”). 
 174. Brown, 803 A.2d at 958.  Recognizing that it frustrates the purpose of ASFA to 
have children remain in foster care while additional hearings are scheduled to determine 
the merits of termination, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted Rule 26.1, which 
requires its clerk’s office to schedule any appeal in a termination case “for submission on 
a date certain that assumes no extensions for the filing of the record or the parties’ 
briefs.”  Id. at 958 n.48. 
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A.  A  Model for Efficiency 
1.   Efficiency in Action 
Specific and detailed timetables for the stages of the court process are 
vital to reducing delay.175  These guidelines are found in statutes and 
court rules, leaving courts to simply “ascertain and give effect to the 
intention of the legislature.”176  To achieve this, the courts first look to 
the words used in the statutes or rules.177  Therefore, such mandates must 
set out specific deadlines and be made legally binding upon the courts.178  
As long as the statutory language is unmistakable, the courts are 
prevented from “reading into” the statute any meaning other than its plain 
meaning.179  This prevents the courts from giving effect to exceptions, 
limitations, or conditions not expressly provided for in the statute.180 
An effective model for the successful tightening of time frames in 
court processes can be found in the San Diego civil courts.  In 1986, San 
Diego County implemented a pilot program called “fast track.”181  This 
program was sanctioned by the California state legislature as part of the 
Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (TCDRA).182  The premise underlying this 
reform effort throughout the state was to shift responsibility for the 
expeditious treatment of civil cases from the attorneys and their clients 
to the judiciary.183  This Act gave the Judicial Council of California the 
responsibility of adopting standards of timely disposition.184  Based on 
these legislative initiatives, the San Diego program set its own goal of 
having 90% of civil cases processed within twelve months.185 
As a result of the pilot program, the number of cases completed within 
one year of the filing of the complaint significantly increased.186  Prior to 
the implementation of fast track, only 19% of the San Diego County 
superior courts’ cases had been completed within one year of filing.187  
In fiscal year 1996–97, 56% of general civil unlimited cases and 76% of 
 
 175. IDAHO CHILD PROTECTION MANUAL, supra note 150, at I-8 to I-9. 
 176. In re D.L., 727 N.E.2d at 994. 
 177. Id. 
 178. IDAHO CHILD PROTECTION MANUAL, supra note 150, at I-8 to I-9. 
 179. In re D.L., 727 N.E.2d at 994. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Michael A. Friedrichs, Fast Track: A Panacea for a Delayed and Cluttered 
Court System?, 1 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 443, 443 (1993). 
 182. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 68600–19 (West Supp. 2003). 
 183. Patrick O’Donnell, Civil Case Management: New Statewide Rules and Case 
Management Statement, 24 CIV. LITIG. REP. 141, 141 (2002). 
 184. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68603. 
 185. Friedrichs, supra note 181, at 446. 
 186. Id. at 444. 
 187. Id. 
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limited civil cases were disposed of in less than twelve months.188  
Progress has been made in more recent years as well; 64% of all general 
civil cases and 85% of limited civil cases were disposed of in twelve months 
in fiscal year 2000–01.189  These results indicate that the combination of 
specific goals set by the legislature and a commitment to reform by the 
courts can accomplish meaningful change. 
Unfortunately, the fast track procedures in San Diego County have not 
been applied to juvenile or domestic cases.190  In fact, the TCDRA 
specifically excludes juvenile and domestic relations cases from the delay 
reduction programs.191  This excludes from delay reduction efforts those 
cases where urgency is most essential.  Rather than excluding these 
cases, special efforts should be made to address the court delay problem 
in child placement cases, and similar guidelines and standards should be 
imposed throughout all jurisdictions. 
Rules should address common court procedures and how they should 
function in the context of child placement matters.  Model court rules 
drafted by the Judicial Council of California’s Center for Families, 
Children and the Courts have put forward a number of recommendations 
for improving court processes in these cases.192  The proposed rules 
recommend that courts not continue hearings beyond the statutory time 
limit unless it is determined that the continuance will not be contrary to 
the best interests of the child.193  Court dates should be regarded as firm, 
and the courts must enforce this principle in order for the dates to have 
credibility.194  Continuances should only be granted on a showing of 
good cause.195  These recommendations can be helpful, but they lack the 
specificity that is necessary in order to truly guide child placement 
matters. 
 
 188. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 2002 COURT STATISTICS REPORT 48 tbl.6 (2002), 
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/csr2002.pdf. 
 189. Id.  Furthermore, in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of the previous program, 
the Judicial Council developed new and amended civil case management rules that became 
effective in all state trial courts in 2002.  These rules include uniform deadlines for serving 
pleadings and requesting default judgments.  O’Donnell, supra note 183, at 141–45. 
 190. Friedrichs, supra note 181, at 446. 
 191. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68608(a) (West Supp. 2003). 
 192. Center for Families, Children and the Courts, Judicial Council of California, 
Draft Model Local Rules, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/resources/publications/ 
localrules.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. Id. 
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2.  Recommendations 
This Comment recommends that change begin with amended federal 
statutes that guide states in conducting child placement proceedings 
efficiently.  These statutes should set time frames even tighter than those 
prescribed in ASFA in order to truly acknowledge children’s sense of 
time.196  In the absence of amended federal statutes, state legislatures can 
ask for a federal waiver in order to implement a more expedient 
framework on their own.197 
First, in any situation where a child is taken from the parent, either by 
voluntary surrender or involuntary protective custody, a petition for a 
hearing shall be filed within twenty-four hours, and in the case of a child 
in protective custody, a detention hearing shall be held twenty-four 
hours after filing.  In any situation, an adjudication hearing shall be held 
within ten calendar days.  At this hearing, the court shall appoint a 
guardian ad litem for the child and make a temporary custody 
determination, be it with prospective adoptive parents or in foster care. 
The preliminary hearing shall take place no more than seven days after 
the adjudication hearing.  A number of things can be determined at the 
preliminary hearing.  In the situation of a dependent child, a case plan 
shall be approved.  In the case of a contested adoption, parental rights 
can be terminated or the court can set an evidentiary hearing date when 
contested issues will be addressed.  This evidentiary hearing shall be 
held no later than ten days after the preliminary hearing. 
Next, in the case of a dependent child, if the case plan calls for 
reunification efforts, then review hearings shall be held each month in 
order for the court to consider the progress of a case.  The permanency 
hearing shall be held six months after the case plan is defined as 
reunification.  If reunification is not the case plan, then the permanency 
hearing should be held within thirty days of that decision.  In the case 
of a contested adoption, the judgment of whether parental rights 
should be terminated shall occur within ten days after the evidentiary 
hearing. 
Finally, in any case in which an appeal is filed, the reviewing court 
shall consider the case for immediate decision.  If oral argument is 
necessary, it shall be heard within thirty days after the briefs have been 
 
 196. Although it could be argued that these matters need to proceed slowly in order 
to be handled responsibly, Part V.A.3 will address the feasibility of the following 
suggestions. 
 197. Children’s Bureau, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Child 
Welfare Waiver Demonstration Projects, at www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/initiatives/ 
cwwaiver.htm (last updated June 25, 2003). 
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filed.198  The court shall then enter judgment within thirty days of either 
the submission of the briefs or oral argument.199 
3.  Feasibility 
It may be argued that these time frames are unrealistic and impossible 
to administer.  Many point out that courts are already congested, noting 
unreasonably large caseloads.200  However, research has shown that 
caseloads, which have long been considered an impediment to efficient 
case management, have not proven to be a factor in court delay.201  One 
school of thought holds that work will expand to fill the time frames 
allowed.202  It is conceivable that additional time pressures will necessarily 
motivate courts to devise methods of expediting cases.  In fact, it has 
been reported in some states that the time pressures of ASFA standards 
have helped child welfare staff work more effectively.203 
Courts have demonstrated they can work quickly when certain interests 
are at stake.  Specifically, when the physical well-being of a child is the 
concern, as in the case where parents refuse a lifesaving blood transfusion for 
a deathly ill child, the courts have sprung into action and rendered decisions 
within hours.204  This action is made feasible simply by the willingness of 
those within the court system to make this issue a top priority. 
It can be argued that the decisions in child placement cases should not 
be made too hastily because of the importance and complexity of the 
interests at stake.205  However, the decision of whether to allow a blood 
transfusion over parental objection is arguably as complex as, and even 
 
 198. Stratton, supra note 86, at 130–31. 
 199. Id. at 131. 
 200. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 150, at 11. 
 201. “One of the interesting sets of findings in the Justice Delayed study was that 
several of the structural factors conventionally thought to be responsible for court 
delay—large courts, heavy caseloads, and high trial rates—had no relation to the pace of 
litigation in the 21 courts examined . . . .”  MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 145, at 12. 
 202. C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, PARKINSON’S LAW 2 (1957).  This work contains 
the well-researched theories on public administration that were first revealed in The 
Economist.  Id. at viii–ix, 3. 
 203. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33, at 28. 
 204. GOLDSTEIN ET AL, supra note 19, at 42.  For specific examples of the prompt 
decisionmaking in these cases, see Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 771–72 (Ill. 1952) 
(holding a hearing and concluding it the day after the petition for guardianship was filed); 
State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751, 754 (N.J. 1962) (providing a decision after the following 
measures were taken to expedite the case: the complaint was submitted orally, formal 
pleadings and notice were waived, and the trial was held at 8:30 and concluded at 11:30). 
 205. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33, at 28. 
HELDMAN.DOC 1/9/2020  4:31 PM 
 
1030 
more vital than, a decision regarding a child’s placement.  The interplay 
of life and death, freedom of religion and the child’s right to life, creates 
a complicated legal conundrum.  Yet the glaring need for prompt resolution 
provides the impetus for quick and meaningful decisionmaking. 
It is clear that when the concern is with the child’s physical well-
being, the courts can make meaningful and swift decisions.206  However, 
when the concern is with the child’s psychological well-being, the courts 
are less willing to take on a role of such urgency.207  The specific 
timetables proposed above will send the unambiguous message that the 
psychological well-being of a child must be given the same regard as the 
physical well-being.  Once the laws are adjusted to reflect this perspective, 
the courts must then be held accountable for administering these laws as 
they are designed. 
B.   A Model for Accountability 
1.   Accountability in Action 
Accountability is a cornerstone of this country’s justice system.  
Individuals are accountable for the actions they take, and consequences 
are rendered for actions that do not comply with the standards 
designated by law.208  Similarly, when systems fail to evolve with public 
policy established by the community, these systems must also be held 
accountable.  As the policy on child placement matters evolves so as to 
prioritize the protection of children from unreasonable delay, the 
systems that serve those children should be held accountable for 
complying with such a framework.  This sort of accountability came into 
play when public perception of domestic violence underwent a 
transformation in the last half of the twentieth century.209  The court 
system and law enforcement agencies were slow to comply with the new 
laws and recently recognized rights of protection.210  Where traditional 
norms dictated that domestic conflicts were private matters,211 new laws 
regarding such abuse demanded involvement by the state.212   
Law enforcement was forced to recognize this change in public policy 
 
 206. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 42. 
 207. Id. at 42–43. 
 208. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 429 (1981) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the accountability of each individual is central to law and society). 
 209. See Developments in the Law—Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1502–03 (1993). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 1528–29. 
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through cases such as Thurman v. City of Torrington,213 in which police 
officers were held accountable for failing to protect a woman who was 
attacked by her estranged husband.214  A multi-million dollar judgment 
was entered against the police department, motivating the department to 
improve its response to domestic violence.215  Here, the court was the 
instrument through which an organization serving the public was held 
accountable for complying with the spirit of the law.  This method of 
accountability has altered the way in which the systems charged with the 
protection of citizens view and respond to domestic abuse. 
In a similar fashion, social services systems have been held accountable 
for failure to comply with laws that serve to protect children in the foster 
care system.  In the case of Jeanine B. v. McCallum,216 the plaintiffs 
argued that the defendants had “continuously and systematically” failed 
to petition for the termination of parental rights in a timely manner.217  In 
addition, the plaintiffs complained that the system had failed to take the 
appropriate steps to place foster children in adoptive homes.218  Judge 
Randa of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
held that ASFA created enforceable federal statutory rights that gave the 
plaintiff children a claim against the defendant governor and others.219  
This allowed those in charge of the system to be held accountable for the 
system’s failures. 
Both of the above cases utilized 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes 
liability on anyone who deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”220  This can translate 
into a private right of action for the violation of a federal statute.221  This 
federal right was the basis for the above decisions, which held state 
actors accountable for their failure to evolve along with the newly 
 
 213. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). 
 214. Id. at 1524–26. The woman had complained to the police department on several 
previous occasions that the husband had harassed, threatened, and attacked her.  The police 
department continually failed to take action to protect the woman and her infant son.  Id. 
 215. Schafran, supra note 143, at 1068. 
 216. No. 93-C-0547, 2001 WL 748062 (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2001). 
 217. Id. at *2. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id at *5. 
 220. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see also JAMES R. MARSH, JEANINE B. V. MCCALLUM: 
ESTABLISHING A FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHT TO ADOPTION OPPORTUNITIES FOR FOSTER 
CHILDREN, Decision page 3, at http://www.e-lawpublishing.com/images/JeanineB.e-Book.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2003). 
 221. MARSH, supra note 220, at Decision page 3. 
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formed public policy embodied by the law. 
In order to determine whether a statute gives rise to such a federal 
right, a three-prong test, developed by the Supreme Court and referred to 
as the Blessing test, must be applied.222  This test has three requirements: 
(1) Congress must have intended the statute to benefit the plaintiff, (2) 
the right must not be so “vague and amorphous” that its enforcement 
would “strain judicial competence,” and (3) the statute must impose a 
binding obligation on the states.223 
Whereas this technique has motivated both law enforcement and 
social service agencies to respond to developing public policy, judicial 
immunity prevents the use of such a tool to motivate the judiciary.224  
Although the Supreme Court itself interpreted § 1983 as allowing for 
injunctive relief against a judicial officer,225 Congress effectively 
overruled this decision with the Federal Courts Improvement Act 
(FCIA).226  The FCIA amended § 1983 to provide that injunctive relief 
shall no longer be granted in an action brought against a judicial officer.227  
Therefore, § 1983 cannot be used as a tool for holding courts accountable 
to any legislatively imposed time frames for processing child placement 
cases.  What remains is a framework of accountability that must be largely 
internal, consisting of court rules that are specific and largely 
nondiscretionary, informal methods of evaluation and discipline, and the 
allowance of limited public access to court proceedings. 
2.  Recommendations 
a.  Accountability Through Court Rules 
In creating court rules that include mechanisms for accountability, the 
Blessing test can be informative, although not determinative, as a 
framework for accountability.228  Using the Blessing test, it is essential 
 
 222. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). 
 223. Id. at 340–41. 
 224. The courts of today have enjoyed absolute immunity for official actions. 
Griffin & Pelegrin, supra note 165, at 385. 
 225. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541–42 (1984).  In this case, a civil rights suit 
was brought under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief against a magistrate who continually 
imposed bail for nonjailable offenses.  Griffin & Pelegrin, supra note 165, at 409.  The 
Supreme Court held that judges were not immune from suits for injunctive relief, 
rationalizing that Congress had intended that § 1983 apply to all state actors.  Id. at 411. 
 226. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 
(1996); see also Guerin v. Higgins, 8 Fed. Appx. 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2001) (articulating the 
fact that the FCIA overruled Pulliam).  The FCIA was passed in response to the holding 
in Pulliam and states that injunctive relief against a judicial officer is barred unless 
declaratory relief is violated or unavailable.  Griffin & Pelegrin, supra note 165, at 391. 
 227. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 § 309(c). 
 228. The Supreme Court, through the Blessing test, detailed standards by which one 
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that guidelines (1) are intended to benefit waiting children, (2) are not 
vague or amorphous, and (3) impose a binding obligation on the courts.229 
Following this helpful framework, the first step suggests that language 
in a court rule should specifically state that the rule is intended to apply 
to any child who is awaiting a permanent placement.  The rule must 
clearly refer to children residing with prospective adoptive parents, as 
well as those who have been removed from their parents involuntarily 
and are now in the care of the state. 
Second, given the above model for efficiency, the guidelines and 
timetables should be adequately clear.  Actual deadlines should be 
used, rather than vague phrases such as “as expeditiously as 
possible.”230  When the goal is vague, courts are only evaluated against 
each other.  If general practices are inadequate, then evaluators can 
only discern which courts are the most or least inadequate.  When the 
goals are specific, on the other hand, it is possible for courts to be 
evaluated effectively.  It then becomes clear when courts are meeting 
or failing to meet specified deadlines, thus alerting review panels of a 
potential problem. 
Finally, the rule should clearly be made binding upon the courts.  This is 
achieved through the use of mandatory, rather than precatory, language.  
Rules governing child placement matters should clearly delineate 
standards for performance and introduce these standards using the word 
“shall.”  The word “shall” signals to courts that the directive is mandatory, 
rather than just suggestive.231  This formal approach to creating court 
rules provides a necessary backdrop to the informal disciplinary 
techniques that are used internally in order to promote change and 
accountability.232 
 
could be held accountable to federal laws.  Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 
(1997).  By following the same standards, courts can devise their own rules and guidelines 
that will send an unambiguous message that their standards are to be taken seriously. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Stratton, supra note 86, at 129. 
 231. Rea Enters. v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 125 Cal. Rptr. 201,  
203 (1975) (setting forth the “well established rule of statutory construction that the 
word ‘shall’ connotes mandatory action and ‘may’ connotes discretionary action”). 
 232. “[T]he mere presence of more formal means for remedying judicial 
misconduct provides an incentive for judges to take seriously the informal suggestions of 
the [administrative] judge.”  Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial 
Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 283 (1993). 
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b.  Internal Accountability 
Given the freedom and protection furnished to judges, internal methods of 
accountability, sometimes referred to as the “tools of judicial 
administration,”233 must be employed to ensure compliance with imposed 
standards.  The courts and their administrative bodies must institute practices 
that manifest a commitment to evaluating judges on the basis of how 
effectively they handle child placement cases.  This provides judicial review 
panels with a basis upon which to take disciplinary action when necessary.234 
 The actions of judicial councils and chief judges have been effective 
methods in addressing issues such as decisionmaking delays in federal 
courts.235  The most effective techniques are not punitive, but instead focus 
on “consultation, reasoned arguments, persuasion, and publicity.”236  In 
fact, simple tactics, such as a visit or communication from a chief judge, 
are capable of bringing about a transformation in a judge’s attitude.237  
This sort of judicial leadership has been identified as a necessary 
ingredient in reducing court delay, and the reported effectiveness of 
these approaches supports this premise.238 
Informal mechanisms that acknowledge successful efforts and bring to 
light a lack of compliance can be effective in motivating the courts 
toward reform.239  Peer influence has been identified as a useful tool in 
promoting judicial accountability.240  Judicial self-monitoring, where the 
 
 233. Judicial administration refers to the practice of developing and administering 
policies that make it possible for courts to handle matters fairly, economically, and 
expeditiously.  Id. at 259. 
 234. It has been asserted that judicial discipline serves three main purposes.  
Sambhav N. Sankar, Comment, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1233, 1237–38 (2000).  The first is public accountability.  Id.  The second is enforcing 
adherence to the law, “so that neutral principles rather than a judge’s personal 
preferences motivate her decision in each individual case.”  Id. at 1238.  The third is 
ensuring that judges “conform to professional standards of behavior and conduct—so 
that in exercising their authority they do not alienate or lose the respect of those who are 
subjected to it.”  Id. 
 235. Geyh, supra note 232, at 260. 
 236. Id. at 262.  These are the methods that are utilized by circuit judicial councils, 
which are administrative bodies existing in each judicial circuit.  Id. at 262. 
 237. Id. at 268. 
 238. Id. at 276–77. 
 239. It has been observed that more “informal” actions are both “extremely efficient 
and effective in many situations.” Sankar, supra note 234, at 1254.  These informal 
actions are more appropriate to the issues discussed in this Comment, as more formal 
methods, such as elections and impeachment, are unavailable except as a response to the 
most extreme objectionable conduct.  Id. at 1269. 
 240. Geyh, supra note 232, at 304.  “A judge who falls significantly behind in his 
work is coaxed—and usually effectively—to keep up. . . .  Few judges are willing to risk 
public attention by persistently rejecting their colleagues’ overtures.”  Id. (quoting Irving 
R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 708 (1979) (referring 
specifically to cases of judges who create delay)). 
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courts review their own levels of efficiency and report the results to the 
judges, has also proven to be effective.241 
Although these informal methods are regarded as the most effective, 
there is nevertheless a sense that these procedures are designed to 
handhold judges and hide their weaknesses from the public.  This 
directly conflicts with the ultimate objective of accountability, which is 
the obligation to answer to the public itself.  Therefore, in addition to 
informal internal accountability mechanisms, practices that allow for 
public scrutiny must be developed. 
c.  Accountability to the General Public 
“Open courtrooms . . . place our system of justice before the public 
and thus make it accountable.”242  While some states have reconsidered 
closed courtrooms in juvenile delinquency proceedings, there is still a 
strong presumption of closed courtrooms in dependency proceedings.243  
However, it is argued that this secrecy is detrimental to the system of 
justice, as it protects the decisionmakers from scrutiny and allows them 
to operate with incompetence, disregard, or abusive discretion.244  This is 
especially troublesome in the context of child placement matters.  It has 
already been shown that judicial attitudes have a great bearing upon 
whether standards will be adhered to and whether personal agendas will be 
injected into decisionmaking.  Thus, the closed dependency courtroom 
can be a breeding ground for impropriety. 
In contrast, the juvenile delinquency system has undergone reform in 
this area.  Where it was once believed that the state could successfully step 
into the role of a substitute parent for delinquent children, able to nurture 
and rehabilitate them, it became clear that the state was failing, to the 
detriment of the juveniles and the rest of society.245  Hence, juvenile 
 
 241. A most effective device is information that compares judges within the same 
court system.  Many courts provide the judges with a weekly status report that ranks the 
individual dockets according to age and size and includes the number of pending cases in 
the pretrial and trial stages.  This is a form of accountability.  Although few judges would 
admit that they compete with their colleagues, no judge wants to have the largest or 
oldest docket.  LITIGATION CONTROL, supra note 144, at 13. 
 242. Bean, supra note 42, at 1. 
 243. Id.  For a comprehensive list of state statutes regarding access to dependency 
proceedings, see id. at 1 n.5. 
 244. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 
1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that “secrecy insulates the participants, masking 
impropriety, obscuring incompetence, and concealing corruption”). 
 245. Arthur R. Blum, Comment, Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons: 
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delinquency hearings have recently allowed for greater access in order to 
expose the weaknesses of the system, as well as to protect the public by 
alerting them to the identities of the juvenile offenders in their midst.246 
This wave of reform has washed right by those who are most in need 
of a protective and watchful eye.247  The children involved in dependency 
proceedings are the ones whose plights should most clearly signal the 
need for public awareness.  Exposing the public to the realities facing 
these children of the court can serve as the impetus for reform.  Public 
scrutiny can be influential in ensuring that decisions are made according 
to standards of public policy rather than individual biases.248 
Media attention can be a strong motivator for compliance. A great 
amount of public attention was focused on the issue of contested 
adoptions in the mid-1990s because of the media’s coverage of the 
issue.249  In fact, Justice Heiple himself referred to the impact of this 
kind of attention during the Baby Richard case.250  He lashed out at 
columnist Bob Greene, who had generated much commentary on the 
case, stating that Green’s columns were “designed to discredit [Heiple] 
as a judge and the Supreme Court as a dispenser of justice by stirring up 
disrespect and hatred among the general population.”251 
Although the judges denounced Greene’s characterization of the case 
and asserted that public opinion had no place in judicial decisionmaking, 
the media attention did effect some change.  The public outcry resulted 
in new legislation,252 as well as many scholarly examinations of the 
concepts of due process rights of parents and the best interests of 
children.253  If nothing else, public attention can put pressure on judges 
to explain their actions.254  This prevents decisions from being made in 
anonymity, isolated from scrutiny.255 
 
Introducing Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 370–72 (1996). 
 246. Bean, supra note 42, at 2–4. 
 247. Id. at 7. 
 248. Id. at 52. 
 249. See supra note 39. 
 250. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 189–90 (Ill. 1994). 
 251. Id. at 189. 
 252. Kelson, supra note 14, at 369 n.115; see also Zito, supra note 25, at 455–57. 
 253. See Kelson, supra note 14 (analyzing the best interest of children standard); 
see also Boccaccini, supra note 62 (arguing for the prioritization of children’s liberty 
interests over those of the biological parents); Eisen, supra note 34 (outlining a brief case 
plan approach to contested adoptions); Scarnecchia, supra note 41 (arguing for a child’s 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in security from state-imposed harm). 
 254. See Ex parte C.V., 810 So. 2d 700, 707–08 (Ala. 2001) (Lyons, J., concurring 
specially).  Justice Lyons states that “being aware of the degree of . . . the public discussion 
concerning this case, I am compelled to preface my views on the merits of this case with 
some observations on the authority and responsibility of judges.”  Id. 
 255. See Schafran, supra note 143, at 1064, 1080. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
These cases involve a most fundamental decision: the determination of 
who will serve as a child’s parent.  They touch the most vulnerable 
among us: those who need protection and placement in order to mitigate 
the effects of the trauma they have undoubtedly suffered before coming 
to the court.  Through a partnership of the legislature, the courts, and the 
public, and the commitment to efficiency and accountability, standards 
can be set and enforced in order to provide these children with the 
stability they need in an expeditious manner. 
The plan begins with Congress continuing to reshape and redefine  
federal laws in order to align them with the goal articulated by one of its 
own members: “an America . . . where every child has the opportunity to 
live in a safe, a stable, a loving, and a permanent home.”256  Federal and 
state lawmakers must dedicate themselves to creating specific and 
unambiguous statutes and rules that stipulate time frames for child 
placement decisions, reflecting an understanding of the child’s perspective 
on time and need for stability and permanency. 
Next, the public must continue to advocate on behalf of those without 
a voice, engaging the media in the investigation and publication of the 
failures of the systems.  In order to assist this effort, courtrooms that 
were once closed to the public should now be open so that the public 
may have the access it needs to keep watch over the system. 
Ultimately, responsibility falls on the shoulders of the courts themselves.  
Courts at all levels must obligate themselves to designing strategies that 
will comply with legislative mandates.  Judicial training and education 
must stress that courts have an irrefutable responsibility to the well-
being of children.  Evaluators and review panels must communicate 
specific standards to the courts, honestly and fairly report where 
weaknesses exist, and hold their members accountable for noncompliance. 
 As one child advocate suggests: 
We shall know the courts have fulfilled their obligation when we find them 
open at 2:00 a.m., with counsel ordered present, with social workers examined 
as to whether they can finish their tasks within the next twenty-four hours; when 
these children of the court are given the kind of “stay up all night and worry” 
attention of a responsible parent when his or her child is in danger or adrift.257 
 
 256. 143 CONG. REC. S12670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. DeWine). 
 257. Interview with Robert Fellmeth, Executive Director, Children’s Advocacy 
Institute, University of San Diego School of Law, in San Diego, Cal. (Oct. 14, 2002). 
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It has often been said that a society is judged by the way it treats its 
children.  By this standard, our society can do much better.  It is now 
upon us to judge the judges, to insist that our society becomes one that 
values its children and ensures that a loving home awaits each child at 
the end of the day. 
JESSICA K. HELDMAN 
 
